This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric multiprize competitions in which players' costs need not be strictly increasing in their performance. Such costs accommodate various types of asymmetries, including head starts.
Introduction
A head start is an advantage a competitor has at the outset of a competition, which must be overcome by other competitors if they are to have any chance of winning. For example, in a competition for promotions in which a worker's tenure plays a role, workers who have worked longer for the firm enjoy a head start. In a political campaign, the incumbent may have a head start in the form of a constituency advantage over an entrant. In a lobbying scenario, some lobbyists may have a reputational advantage. In a research and development (R&D) setting, some firms may start out with more advanced technologies than other firms. In a sports competition, some competitors may enjoy a head start in the form of a "handicap." But despite the prevalence of head starts in real-world competitions, the relevant existing models typically do not allow for head starts.
This paper investigates equilibrium behavior in a single-prize and multiprize contest model that allows for a wide range of asymmetries among players, including head starts. In a contest, each player chooses a non-negative "score" and pays the associated cost, and the players with the highest scores obtain one prize each. All prizes are identical. 1 Each player is characterized by his valuation for a prize and a continuous cost function, which specifies the cost associated with each score. Valuations and cost functions may differ across players, which allows for a high degree of heterogeneity among them. The primitives of the model are commonly known, capturing players' knowledge of the asymmetries among them. 2 Contests are defined in Section 2.
In contrast to most existing models, players' costs need not be strictly, or even weakly, increasing in score. 3 This accommodates head starts, subsidies that are contingent on a minimal level of performance, and non-monotonic mappings between a player's performance and the cost he incurs. A head start is modeled as an interval with lower bound 0 on which the player's costs 1 Some examples of contests with identical prizes are competitions for promotions in a hierarchical organization, competitions for committee seats, and competitions for scholarships. The Conclusion discusses the challenges in accommodating heterogeneous prizes. 2 Models of competition with incomplete information were studied by Erwin Amann and Wolfgang Leininger When not restricted to two or ex-ante symmetric players, these models do not fully characterize equilibrium behavior. In contrast, the multiplayer asymmetric contest model presented here postulates complete information and provides a full characterization of equilibrium. Other models of competition postulate a probabilistic relation between competitors' efforts and prize allocation. See Gordon Tullock (1980) and Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981) . For a comprehensive treatment of the literature on competitions with sunk investments, see Shmuel Nitzan (1994) and Kai A. Konrad (2009) . 3 Siegel (2011b) studies a related model with non-monotonic costs, but focuses on payoffs and does not solve for equilibrium.
are 0. A subsidy is modeled as an interval on which the player's costs are constant, where the lower bound of the interval corresponds to the minimal level of performance required to obtain the subsidy, and the length of the interval corresponds to the increase in performance resulting from the subsidy. Non-monotonic costs model situations in which better performance is not necessarily more costly. For example, competing researchers often enjoy certain parts of the research process (such as proving a conjecture), but dislike other parts of the process (such as writing a transparent proof). In the context of a competition for promotions, many professionals are intrinsically motivated and derive utility from working reasonably hard (but not too hard) even in the absence of compensation.
Costs that are not strictly increasing introduce a modeling subtlety, which is easily seen by considering head starts. Suppose, for example, that in a competition for promotions a worker's overall performance is determined by adding his tenure t to some non-negative function of the quality of his work. This implies that the worker has a head start of t, which is a lower bound on his performance in the competition. But in the contest in which the player's costs are 0 up to t, the player can choose scores lower than t. These scores are, of course, weakly dominated by t. To avoid this modeling mismatch, I restrict attention to equilibria in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. To characterize such equilibria, it suffices to consider contests in which players' costs are weakly increasing. This is because, for any contest, a simple mapping identifies a contest with weakly increasing costs whose equilibria coincide with those of the original contest when players do not choose weakly dominated scores. Section 2.1 describes this mapping.
Section 3 presents, for a large class of contests with weakly increasing costs, a constructive characterization of the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. This class includes contests with m + 1 players and m prizes, as well as many contests with more than m + 1 players. The construction relies on knowledge of players' equilibrium payoffs, which is provided by Ron Siegel's (2009) payoff result. This construction generalizes the equilibrium uniqueness results of Siegel (2010) , which apply to contests with strictly increasing costs. 4 Section 4 applies the equilibrium construction results to study multiprize all-pay auctions with head starts, in which all players have the same commonly known valuation for a prize. Each player is characterized by a non-negative head start, all players pay their bids, and a player's score equals the sum of his bid and his head start. I model this game as a contest, in which each player pays the maximum of his score minus his head start and zero. The contest has a unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores, and this equilibrium corresponds to the unique equilibrium of the original game. The equilibrium depends qualitatively on the relative magnitudes of players' head starts. A Matlab procedure that constructs the equilibrium is available on my website. 5 Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium when there are three players and two prizes. 6 Player i's head start is a i , with a 1 > a 2 > a 3 = 0, and the value of each of the two prizes is V > a 1 . In equilibrium, each player has an "atom" at his head start (that is, chooses his head start with a positive probability), and with the remaining probability chooses scores from one or two intervals. Figure 1 : The supports of players' strategies (dots represent atoms) in the unique equilibrium of a three-player, two-prize all-pay auction with head starts when a 2 is relatively large (left) and when a 2 is relatively small (right)
When a 2 is relatively small (the right-hand side of Figure 1 ), the equilibrium can be thought of as including two "competition zones:" a "minor league" and a "major league." Players 2 and 3 choose whether to invest and, conditional on investing, in which league to compete. Player 1 competes only in the major league when he invests. In the major league, players compete for both prizes. In the minor league, players compete for only one prize (player 1 always beats any player who competes in the minor league). Conditional on competing within a league, all players are equally aggressive. 7 When a 2 is relatively large (the left-hand side of Figure ( 2003). 9 All-pay auctions with head starts and two prizes have also been studied, independently from this paper, by Casas-Arce and Martínez-Jerez (2010). 10 Section 4.2 characterizes, for any number of prizes, all the equilibrium configurations that can be generated by varying players' head starts. The number of such configurations is exponential in the number of prizes, and coincides with a well-known combinatorial object, the Catalan number. This contrasts with the single equilibrium configuration that arises in standard multiprize all-pay auctions, in which every player's score equals his bid and players differ only in their valuations for a prize. 11 Standard all-pay auctions have been used to model rent-seeking and lobbying activities (Arye L. Hillman and Dov Samet (1987) , Hillman and John G. Riley (1989) , Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, and Casper de Vries (1993, 1996) ), competitions for a monopoly position (Tore Ellingsen (1991)), competitions for multiple prizes (Derek J. Clark and Christian Riis (1998)), sales (Hal Varian (1980) ), and R&D races (Partha Dasgupta (1986) ). 12 Figure 2 depicts the unique equilibrium of a standard all-pay auction with three players and two prizes, in which V 1 > V 2 > V 3 . The supports of players' strategies (dots represent atoms) in the unique equilibrium of a three-player, two-prize standard all-pay auction with V 1 > V 2 > V 3 Section 4.3 compares the equilibrium predictions of standard all-pay auctions to those of all- 9 They considered potentially different valuations for the different players, which the equilibrium construction results in this paper also accommodate. René Kirkegaard (2012) and Christian Seel (2012) analyzed head starts in an incomplete-information all-pay auction with two-players and one prize. 10 In contrast to this paper, Casas-Arce and Martínez-Jerez (2010) did not solve the all-pay auction with more than two prizes, and their analysis and results do not extend to contests with non-linear costs. 11 A notable exception, due to Baye et al. (1996) , is the many equilibrium configurations that arise when players have identical valuations, even if there is only one prize. A slight perturbation of players' valuations, however, leads to a single equilibrium configuration (and a unique equilibrium). 12 Variants of the all-pay auction have been used to investigate the effect of lobbying caps (Che & Gale (1998 and Kaplan & Wettstein (2006) ), R&D races with endogenous prizes (Che & Gale (2003) ), non-linear, ordered costs with one prize (Julio González-Díaz (2009)), and conditional investments (Siegel (2010) ).
pay auctions with head starts. In both contests, stronger players (those with higher valuations or larger head starts) win a prize with higher probability. But whereas in a standard all-pay auction stronger players expend more, the ranking of expenditures is reversed in an all-pay auction with head starts, regardless of the equilibrium configuration. In addition, the two contests differ in their predictions of players' aggressiveness. Appendix A contains the proofs of Proposition 1 and of results from Section 3. Appendix B contains proofs of results from Section 4. Section 1 of the online Appendix contains three examples of two-player contests and their equilibria. Section 2 of the online Appendix applies the equilibrium construction results to derive the equilibrium of a three-player, two-prize all-pay auction with head starts. Section 3 of the online Appendix considers some contest design issues for all-pay auctions with head starts. 13 
Definitions and Existing Results
In a contest, n players compete for m homogeneous prizes, 0 < m < n. The set of players {1, . . . , n} is denoted by N . Players compete by each choosing a score from [0, ∞), simultaneously and independently. Each of the m players with the highest scores wins one prize. In case of a relevant tie, any procedure may be used to allocate the tie-related prizes among the tied players.
Each player i is characterized by his valuation for a prize, V i > 0, and his cost function, c i : [0, ∞) → R. Given s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), where s i is player i's chosen score, player i's payoff is
is player i's probability of winning, which satisfies
1 if s j < s i for n − m or more players j 6 = i, and P j∈N P j (s) = m. Differences among players are captured by their different valuations for a prize and by differences in their cost functions. The primitives of the contest are commonly known.
I make the following assumptions. C1 c i is continuous and piecewise analytic.
14 Assumption C1 allows for non-monotonic costs. Such costs are useful in modeling competitions in which better performance is not necessarily more costly, such as competitions for promotions between intrinsically motivated workers. Head starts are accommodated by having costs equal to 0 on some interval of scores with lower bound 0.
Let
C2 c i (s i ) = l i for some s i ≥ 0, and
The first part of Assumption C2 says that player i can guarantee himself a payoff of −l i . When l i < 0, as may be the case with intrinsically motivated workers, this payoff is positive. The second part of Assumption C2 means that sufficiently high scores are prohibitively costly. Assumption C3 below is a genericity condition, which completes the description of a contest. It uses the following definition.
Definition 1 (i) Player i's reach r i is the highest score whose cost does not exceed his highest possible payoff from losing by more than his valuation for a prize. That is, r i = max {s i : c i (
Re-index players in (any) decreasing order of their reach, so that r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ . . . ≥ r n .
(ii) Player m + 1 is the marginal player.
(iii) The threshold T of the contest is the reach of the marginal player:
The power w i of player i is his payoff if he chooses the least costly score no lower than the threshold and wins:
Note that c L i ≡ c i when costs are weakly increasing. For example, in a standard all-pay auction (Hillman and Samet (1987) , Hillman and Riley (1989) , Clark and Riis (1998) ) all costs are linear, a player's reach is equal to his valuation for a prize (because l i = 0), and a player's power is equal to his valuation for a prize minus the marginal player's valuation for a prize.
C3 (i) The marginal player is the only player i with power −l i . (ii) The marginal player's cost function is increasing immediately below the threshold, i.e., for some ε > 0 and every x in (T − ε, T ) we have c m+1 (x) < c m+1 (T ).
For example, a standard all-pay auction satisfies part (ii) of Assumptions C3 because players' costs are strictly increasing. If the valuation of the marginal player is different from those of the other players, then part (i) of Assumption C3 is satisfied as well.
14 A function is piecewise analytic on [0, T ] if [0, T ] can be partitioned into a finite number of closed intervals such that the restriction of the function to each interval is analytic. Analytic functions include polynomials, the exponent function, trigonometric functions, and power functions. Sums, products, compositions, reciprocals, and derivatives of analytic functions are analytic (see, for example, Charles P. Chapman (2002)).
Equilibrium and Weakly Dominated Scores
A player's (mixed) strategy is a probability distribution over [0, ∞), typically described as a cumulative distribution function (CDF), which for every score x specifies the probability that the player chooses a score lower than or equal to x. I say that player i does not choose weakly dominated scores if his CDF assigns probability 0 to the set of scores {x : c i (x) ≥ c i (y) for a score y > x} .
Otherwise, I say that player i chooses weakly dominated scores. An equilibrium is a profile of strategies, one for each player, such that each player's strategy assigns probability 1 to the player's set of best responses given the other players' strategies.
As discussed in the introduction, this paper focuses on equilibria in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. To investigate such equilibria it suffices to study a restricted class of contests, in which players' cost functions are non-decreasing and equal 0 at 0. To see why, given a contest C consider the modified contestĈ in which player i's costs areĉ i (·) = c L i (·) − l i and his valuation is V i .
Proposition 1
The set of equilibria in C in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores is the same as the set of equilibria inĈ in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. Moreover, in any such equilibrium player i's payoff in C is precisely l i lower than his payoff inĈ.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A. It is straightforward to verify thatĈ is a contest in which players' costs are weakly increasing and equal 0 at 0 (sol i = 0 for every player i). For such contests, Assumptions C1-C3 are equivalent to the following Assumptions M1-M3.
M1 c i is continuous, piecewise analytic, and weakly increasing.
M3 (i) The marginal player is the only player with power 0. (ii) The marginal player's cost function is strictly increasing immediately below the threshold.
By Proposition 1, to characterize equilibria in which players do not use weakly dominated scores it suffices to do so for contests that satisfy Assumptions M1-M3. Therefore, for the rest of the paper I restrict attention to contests that satisfy Assumptions M1-M3. Definition 1 simplifies to r i = max {s i : c i (s i ) = V i } , T = r m+1 , and w i = V i − c i (T ).
Existing Results
The contests considered here are a special case of Siegel's (2009) all-pay contest model. 15 The following two results, which I use in solving for equilibrium, are immediate corollaries of results in Siegel (2009) . 16 The first result characterizes players' equilibrium payoffs (without solving for equilibrium).
Theorem 1
In any equilibrium of a contest, the expected payoff of every player equals the maximum of his power and 0.
In addition to giving a closed-form formula for players' equilibrium payoffs, Theorem 1 shows that players 1, . . . , m have positive expected payoffs (because of part (i) of Assumption M3), and players m + 1, . . . , n have expected payoffs of 0.
A player participates in an equilibrium of a contest if with positive probability he chooses scores whose cost is positive. The second result provides a sufficient condition for players m + 2, . . . , n not to participate in any equilibrium.
Theorem 2
If the normalized cost function of the marginal player is strictly lower than that of player i > m + 1, that is,
then player i does not participate in any equilibrium. In particular, if this condition holds for players m + 2, . . . , n, then in any equilibrium only players 1, . . . , m + 1 may participate.
Equilibrium Construction
I provide an algorithm that solves for the unique equilibrium of an (m + 1)-player contest in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. The algorithm generalizes the one described in Siegel (2010) , which applies to contests with strictly increasing costs (in which no scores are weakly dominated). Siegel's (2010) algorithm cannot in general be applied to contests with weakly increasing costs, because it relies on certain equilibrium properties that may not hold when when costs are weakly increasing.
17 15 In particular, a contest here is a generic separable contest of Siegel (2009) . But it is not a special case of Siegel's (2010) contest model, since Siegel (2010) requires strictly increasing costs (which, in particular, preclude head starts). 16 The results follow, respectively, from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Siegel (2009). 17 These properties are that all players' CDFs reach 1 precisely at the threshold, every positive score up to the threshold is a best response for at least two players, and players' equilibrium CDFs are continuous on (0, T ). For example, the latter two properties do not hold in the equilibria depicted in Figure 1 , and the first property does not hold in the equilibrium depicted in Figure 6 in the online Appendix.
An alternative approach to dealing with weakly increasing costs would be to apply Siegel's (2010) algorithm to contests with strictly increasing costs that "approximate" the original contest, and consider the limit of the corresponding equilibria. This is problematic for three reasons. First, it is not clear how to derive analytical results by taking this limit, because the process entails "taking the limit" of an algorithm. Second, even if an equilibrium can be derived in this way, it may have the undesirable property that players choose weakly dominated scores. 18 Third, the "limit" approach leaves unaddressed the issue of equilibrium uniqueness, even within the class of equilibria in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. Section 3.1 describes an equilibrium construction algorithm that applies to contests with weakly increasing costs, and shows that the resulting profile of CDFs is indeed an equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. Section 3.2 shows that this is the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores, and explains to what extent the construction applies to n-player contests.
The Algorithm
The algorithm applies to an (m + 1)-player contest and has five stages. 19 I denote by G = (G 1 , . . . , G m+1 ) the profile of CDFs constructed by the algorithm, where G i (x) is the probability that player i chooses a score lower than or equal to x. The construction of G proceeds from 0 to T by using knowledge of players' equilibrium payoffs (given by Theorem 1) to identify active players and checkpoints. A player is active on his best response set, and a checkpoint is a score above which the set of active players may change. Stage 1 identifies a score x 0 ≥ 0 and the value G (x 0 ) such that G (x) = 0 for any x < x 0 and the value G (x 0 ) suffices to continue the construction above x 0 . If G m+1 (x 0 ) = 1, then x 0 is the last checkpoint and the algorithm proceeds to Stage 5, which completes the definition of G. Otherwise, x 0 is the first checkpoint and the algorithm proceeds to Stage 2. Given a checkpoint x that has been reached, Stage 2 determines a set of candidate players at x, CP (x), which is a superset of the set A + (x) of players active immediately above x. If CP (x) contains a player whose cost function is "constant at x," i.e., constant on some interval of scores with lower endpoint x, then the algorithm proceeds to Stage 3. Otherwise, the cost functions of all players in CP (x) are "increasing at x," i.e. strictly increasing on some interval with lower bound x, and the algorithm proceeds to Stage 4. Stage 3 sets A + (x) to be the set of all players in CP (x) whose costs are constant at x, and identifies the next checkpointx as the upper endpoint of the longest interval with lower endpoint x on which the cost a player in A + (x) is constant. It then sets G equal to G (x) on [x,x), and at most one player has an atom atx. The player and the size of the atom are identified. Stage 4 uses CP (x) to define a function S x,y with a unique fixed point H (x, y) for scores y immediately above x, and uses H (x, y) to determine the set A + (x). It then extends G continuously to [x,x] using a closed-form formula, wherex is the next checkpoint. The checkpointx is also identified. If the CDF of at least one player reaches 1 atx in Stages 3 or 4, thenx is the last checkpoint and the algorithm proceeds to Stage 5. Otherwise, the algorithm returns to Stage 2 withx as the current checkpoint. Stage 5 completes the definition of G by identifying, for each player whose CDF has not reached 1 at the last checkpoint, a score at which he has an atom that brings his CDF to 1. I show that the algorithm terminates after reaching a finite number of checkpoints, and that the resulting G is indeed an equilibrium. Whenever possible, I use notation consistent with that of Siegel (2010) . 20 The algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3 . 20 An exception is my usage of checkpoints in contrast to his usage of switching points. A switching point of Siegel (2010) is a score above which the set of active players does change. Every switching point of a contest with strictly increasing costs is a checkpoint, but some checkpoints may not be switching points. . Because scores below x 0 are weakly dominated by x 0 for the marginal player, set G m+1 (x) = 0 for x < x 0 . The value G m+1 (x 0 ) is set such that at least one player other than the marginal player can have best responses immediately above x 0 , and no player can obtain more than his power by choosing scores immediately above x 0 . The following lemma determines G m+1 (x 0 ) and G i (x) for every player i < m + 1 and x ≤ x 0 . Its proof and those of other results in this section are in Appendix A.
Lemma 1
In any equilibrium of an (m + 1)-player contest in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores, the marginal player has an atom of size min i<m+1 {(w i + c i (x 0 )) /V i } at x 0 , and the value of every other player's CDF at x 0 is 0.
In accordance with Lemma 1, set G m+1 (x 0 ) = min i<m+1 {(w i + c i (x 0 )) /V i } ≤ 1 and G i (x) = 0 for every player i < m+1 and x ≤ x 0 . If G m+1 (x 0 ) = 1, then set x L = x 0 as the last checkpoint and proceed to Stage 5. Otherwise, set x = x 0 as the first checkpoint and proceed to Stage 2. Stage 2: Suppose G has been defined up to x < T, and G i (x) < 1 for every player i. We would like to identify a set of players, the "candidate players at x," who may be active immediately above x. Consider a player i who chooses scores immediately above x when other players choose scores according to G. Because CDFs are right-continuous and the player loses only when his score is lower than those of all other players, 1 − Π j6 =i (1 − G j (x)) + ε is the probability that the player wins a prize, for some small ε ≥ 0. As player i chooses scores closer to x, ε approaches 0. Therefore, if
then player i cannot be active immediately above x, because he cannot obtain his equilibrium payoff there. The candidate players at x are the other players, and for each such player i we have
Let CP (x) = {players i for which (2) holds} denote the set of candidate players at x. The set CP (x) contains at least two players. 22 If CP (x)
contains at least one player whose cost function is constant at x, proceed to Stage 3. Otherwise, proceed to Stage 4. Stage 3: Suppose that CP (x) contains a player i whose cost function is constant at x. Constant costs imply that the other players' CDFs must remain constant immediately above x, otherwise player i would win a prize with too high a probability and therefore obtain more than his power immediately above x. And player i's CDF must also remain constant immediately above x, because for him scores immediately above x are weakly dominated by slightly higher scores. Therefore, all players' CDFs remain constant immediately above x, so the only players for whom scores immediately above x are best responses are those players in CP (x) whose cost functions are constant at x. Therefore, let A + (x) = {players in CP (x) whose cost functions are constant at x} .
Letx i = max {y : c i (y) = c i (x)} andx = max {x i : i ∈ A + (x)}, and choose a player i in A + (x) for whomx i =x. Based on the previous paragraph, extend G to [x,x] as follows. For every player j 6 = i and every score y in [x,x] set G j (y) = G j (x) < 1, and for every score y in
to the lowest value such that CP (x) contains at least one other player. From (2) with l instead of i this means that
and 21 Lemma 11 in Appendix A shows that > does not hold for any player. 22 Lemma 11 in Appendix A shows this.
This value of G i (x) is the only value consistent with equilibrium. Indeed, setting G i (x) to a higher value implies that some player other than i can obtain more than his power immediately abovex. Setting G i (x) to a lower value implies that players other than i do not have best responses immediately abovex and therefore do not choose scores immediately abovex with positive probability. Because player i's costs are increasing atx, this means that player i too does not have best responses immediately abovex, so no player has best responses immediately abovex. This violates the following lemma.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium of an (m + 1)-player contest, any score at which not all players' CDFs equal 1 is a best response for at least one player. 23 and let
The function S x,y (·) is piecewise linear and convex. Since S x,y (0) = 0, S 0 x,y (0) = 0, and ε i (y) > 0 for every player i in CP (x), which contains at least two players, S x,y starts below the diagonal and reaches a slope of at least 2. It therefore has a unique positive fixed point, denoted H (x, y). Let H (x, x) = lim y↓x H (x, y). Siegel (2010) shows that H (x, ·) and ε i (·) for every player i in CP (x) are analytic in a right-neighborhood of x, so have right-derivatives of any order at x. The lowest-order right-derivatives at x of ε i (·) and H (x, ·) that differ (beginning with the zerothorder derivative, that is,
(< means the player is in A + (x), > means the player is not in A + (x)). (This will "generically" stop at the first derivatives.) If all derivatives are equal, then player i is in A + (x). Because ε i (y) < H (x, y) for at least two players i in CP (x) and scores y immediately above x, A + (x)
contains at least two players. Once A + (x) is identified, (2) with y instead of x for every player i in A + (x) and the fact that the CDFs of players not in A + (x) do not increase immediately above x can be used as follows 23 The inequalities follow from Lemma 12 in Appendix A.
to uniquely extend G to scores
For every player i in
where
and |S| is the cardinality of a set S. 24 This continuous extension of G guarantees that immediately above x players in A + (x) obtain precisely their power and players not in A + (x) do not obtain more than their power. The first checkpointx above x is the first score above x at which G i reaches 1 for some player i in A + (x), or the cost function of a player in A + (x) is constant, or the cost functions of all players in A + (x) are increasing and one of the following happens: the hazard rate
of a player i in A + (x) drops to 0, 25 a player not in A + (x) obtains his power, 26 or the score is a concatenation point of the cost function of a player in A + (x) (recall that costs are piecewise- 
. This completes the construction of G.
The following lemma shows that the algorithm always stops.
Lemma 3 The algorithm reaches Stage 5 at a checkpoint x
L ≤ T via a finite number of checkpoints.
Theorem 3 summarizes the construction and shows that the resulting G is an equilibrium.
Theorem 3 For any (m + 1)-player contest the algorithm constructs an equilibrium G in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. The equilibrium is characterized by a partition into a finite number of intervals of positive length, on the interior of which the set of active players remains constant.
The online Appendix describes the execution of the algorithm on three two-player contests. 24 If
25 Ignoring any player whose hazard rate is identically 0 starting at x. 26 That is, (2) holds for some player i not in A + (x).
Equilibrium Uniqueness and n-player Contests
The following result shows that the equilibrium G constructed by the algorithm is the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. The proof uses the property of G that every player's best response set is a finite union of disjoint intervals to show that every equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores coincides with G.
Theorem 4 For any (m + 1)-player contest the algorithm constructs the unique equilibrium of the contest in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores.
A contest with more than m + 1 players may have multiple equilibria in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. 27 Uniqueness is guaranteed, however, if the costs of the marginal player are lower than those of player m + 2, . . . , n. This is the content of the following result.
Theorem 5
If for every player m + 2, . . . , n the conditions of Theorem 2 hold and the highest score whose cost is 0 is no higher than x 0 (the highest score whose cost is 0 for player m+1), then the contest has a unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. In this equilibrium, players m + 2, . . . , n choose their respective highest score whose cost is 0 and players 1, . . . , m + 1 behave as in the equilibrium constructed by the algorithm for the reduced contest with players 1, . . . , m + 1.
Note that the conditions of Theorem 2 place no restrictions on how the cost functions of players 1, . . . , m, m + 2, . . . , n relate to each other.
All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts
In an all-pay auction with head starts, n ≥ 2 risk-neutral players compete for m < n identical prizes of common and commonly known value V > 0. Each player i makes a non-negative, irreversible investment, and this investment is added to his head start a i , with a 1 ≥ · · · ≥ a n ≥ 0. Equivalently, each player can be thought of as choosing a sum, with player i's sum no lower than a i . Each of the m players with the highest sums wins one prize. Relevant ties are decided using any tie-breaking rule (which is specified in advance).
To model this game as a contest, let V i = V and
. 27 See Example 3 in Siegel (2009).
For the contest to meet condition M3, assume that a m+1 is distinct from the head start of every other player. Player i's reach is a i + V , so the contest's threshold is a m+1 + V . Theorem 1 shows that in any equilibrium of the contest the payoff of every player i < m + 1 is equal to his power, i.e., min {a i − a m+1 , V }, and the payoff of the other players is 0. Not every equilibrium of the contest, however, is an equilibrium of the original game. This is because in the contest player i can choose scores lower than a i , which are weakly dominated by a i , whereas in the original game player i's sum is at least a i . Nevertheless, it is easy to see that the set of equilibria of the original game coincides with the set of equilibria of the contest in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. We therefore have the following corollary of Theorem 5.
Corollary 1 An all-pay auction with head starts in which a m > a m+1 > a m+2 has a unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium, players m + 2, . . . , n and every player i for whom a i ≥ a m+1 + V choose their respective head starts.
Proof. The conditions of Theorem 2 hold for players m + 2, . . . , n in the contest corresponding to the original game. Therefore, by Theorem 5 the contest has a unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores, and in this equilibrium players m + 2, . . . , n choose their respective head starts. The power of a player i for whom a i ≥ a m+1 + V equals V , so he cannot choose scores higher than a i in the equilibrium, and scores lower than a i are weakly dominated by a i . Before deriving additional properties of the equilibrium in Section 4.2, let us consider the case of two prizes and three players in some detail (Corollary 1 shows that additional players do not participate).
Three Players and Two Prizes
If a 2 ≥ a 3 + V , then every player chooses his head start, and players 1 and 2 each win a prize with certainty. 28 If a 2 < a 3 + V ≤ a 1 , then player 1 chooses a 1 and wins a prize with certainty, and players 2 and 3 compete as in the two-player contest of Figure 1 in the online Appendix. 29 If a 1 < a 3 + V , then players' behavior is more complicated, and depends on how large a 1 is relative to a 2 and a 3 . Section 2 of the online Appendix applies the algorithm to derive the equilibrium. Specifically, if
2 /V , then players' equilibrium strategies 28 Stage 1 of the algorithm specifies that x 0 = a 3 and G 3 (a 3 ) = 1, and Stage 5 of the algorithm specifies that
29 Stage 1 specifies that x 0 = a 3 and G 3 (a 3 ) = (a 2 − a 3 ) /V , Stage 3 specifies that both players' CDFs remain constant on (a 3 , a 2 ), Stage 4 specifies that G 2 (y) = G 3 (y) = (y − a 3 ) /V for every y in [a 2 , a 3 + V ], and both players' CDFs reach 1 at a 3 + V .
are
and
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4 . Figure 4 : Players' equilibrium atoms and densities when
2 /V , then players' equilibrium strategies are
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 5 . 1/(a 3 + V-a 2 ) , and Figure 5 describes the equilibrium for a 1 ≤ . The qualitative difference between the equilibria is due to the size of player 2's atom at a 2 , which (3) specifies to be the minimal size so that CP (a 2 ) contains a player in addition to player 2. In Figure 4 , this additional player is player 3, whereas in Figure 5 this additional player is player 1.
Players' behavior can be interpreted as follows. When player 1's head start is relatively large (Figure 4 ), players compete in two disjoint "competition zones." In the lower zone, (a 2 , a 1 ), only players 2 and 3 compete. In the higher zone, (a 1 , a 3 + V ), all three players compete. Within the lower zone, player 2 and 3 stop competing at a 3 + V
Each player can be thought of as making a three-stage decision: whether to make an investment (choose a score whose cost is positive), in which competition zone to compete (player 1 competes only in the higher zone), and which score to choose within a zone. When player 1's head start is relatively small (Figure 5 ), players compete only in the higher competition zone. Moreover, conditional on competing in the higher zone, player 3 is more aggressive than the other two players, in the sense that his conditional CDF (conditional on choosing a score in (a 1 , a 3 + V )) first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) the conditional CDFs of the other two players. Player 3's behavior may be interpreted as an "all-or-nothing" response to facing two strong opponents who have relatively similar head starts. The next subsection generalizes these observations to all-pay auctions with head starts and any number of prizes.
Two additional equilibrium properties can be deduced from examining players' CDFs, regardless of whether the equilibrium is described by Figure 4 or Figure 5 . The first property is that the CDF of player 1 FOSD that of player 2, which in turn FOSD that of player 3. This implies that a player with a higher head start wins a prize with a higher probability than a player with a lower head start. The second property is that player 1's (expected) expenditures are lower than those of player 2, which are in turn lower than those of player 3. In Figure 4 this can easily be seen by comparing player 1's strategy to player 2's strategy and then player 2's strategy to player 3's strategy. In Figure 5 this is less obvious, because players 1 and 2 incur costs when competing in the lower part of the higher competition zone, whereas with the corresponding probability player 3 does not invest. Nevertheless, the higher costs incurred by player 3 when choosing scores in the upper part of the higher competition zone more than offset this difference in expenditures. The next subsection shows that these rankings of players' probabilities of winning and expenditures hold for any number of prizes.
Equilibrium Properties
In this subsection, I restrict attention to all-pay auctions with m + 1 players, whose head starts are all strictly less than a m+1 + V . This is without loss of generality, because Corollary 1 shows that without this restriction the "real" competition is between players k + 1, . . . , m + 1, who compete for m − k prizes, where k is the number of players whose head starts are at least a m+1 + V . All statements refer to the unique equilibrium G = (G 1 , . . . , G m+1 ).
The first result shows that players' strategies can be ranked in terms of FOSD.
Proposition 2 For any two players
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix B, as are the proofs of the other results in this section. A corollary of the ranking of players' strategies is that players' probabilities of winning can also be ranked.
Corollary 2 For every two players i < j, player i's probability of winning a prize is at least as high as that of player j, and is strictly higher if and only if a j < a i .
To further characterize players' strategies, note that no player chooses scores in (a m+1 , a m ). 30 And how players choose scores in (a m , a m+1 + V ) depends qualitatively on all players' head starts, as shown in Section 4.1. Letting a 0 = a m+1 + V , each interval (a i , a i−1 ), i ≤ m, can be thought of as a "competition zone," in which a subset A i of the players i, . . . , m + 1 compete, that is, A i = {j ≥ i : player j has best responses in (a i , a i−1 )} .
I refer to the sequence A 1 , . . . , A m as the "competitive characteristic." For example, the competitive characteristic of the equilibrium in Figure 4 is {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3}, and that of the equilibrium in Figure 5 is {1, 2, 3} , φ. The following theorem enumerates properties of the competitive characteristic, shows that each player's set of best responses within a competition zone is an interval in which his CDF strictly increases, and shows that if players k > j compete in the same competition zone, then player k is more aggressive than player j, conditional on choosing scores within the competition zone.
Theorem 6
The unique equilibrium G of an all-pay auction with head starts has the following properties.
is an interval with lower bound l i,j and upper bound h i , and G j (x) > G j (y) for any two scores x > y in (l i,j , h i ). Moreover, h i < a i−1 if i > 1, and h 1 = a m+1 + V . In particular, the upper bound h i is the same for all the players in
For every player i, lim x→a m+1 +V G (x) = 1 (no atoms at the threshold).
(e) If players k > j are in A i , then the conditional CDF of player k FOSD that of player j. That is, for every x in (a i , a i−1 ),
The competitive characteristics of the equilibria in Figures 4 and 5 satisfy part (a) of Theorem 6. The equilibrium in Figure 4 has
the CDFs of players 2 and 3 coincide starting from a 2 , and the CDFs of all players coincide starting from a 1 . The inequality in part (e) of Theorem 6 is an equality for both competition 30 These scores are weakly dominated for players 1, . . . , m. Consequently, player m + 1 wins with probability 0 at these scores, which are costly for him, so he does not choose them.
zones. The equilibrium in Figure 5 has
the CDFs of players 1 and 2 coincide starting from a 1 , and the CDFs of all players coincide starting from l 1,3 . The inequality in part (e) of Theorem 6 is an equality for k = 2 and j = 1, and is a strict inequality for k = 3 and j = 1, 2.
While part (a) of Theorem 6 provides necessary conditions for a sequence of subsets of {1, . . . , m + 1} to form the competitive characteristic, it leaves open the question of which competitive characteristics can be generated by changing players' head starts. To address this question, denote by A m the set of sequences A 1 , . . . , A m that satisfy the conditions listed in part (a) of Theorem 6. For example, A 2 consists of the sequences {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3} , φ.
The following result shows that A m is related to a well-known combinatorial object.
Theorem 7
The cardinality of A m is the Catalan number
The Catalan number C m appears in many combinatorial contexts. For example, it is the number of different ways in which m open parentheses and m close parentheses can be sequenced so that they are correctly matched (for m = 2 there are two such sequences, "(())" and "()()").
The Catalan number C m is also the number of complete binary trees with m + 1 leaves.
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The idea underlying Theorem 7 is that each sequence in A m can be mapped to a sequence of m+1 progressively finer partitions of {1, . . . , m + 1}, and each such sequence of partitions can be mapped to a sequence of correctly matched parentheses. The proof of Theorem 7 describes these mappings, and immediately after the proof in Appendix B I describe an explicit bijection between the set of sequences of correctly matched parentheses and A m . As discussed above, the two sequences {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3} , φ that comprise A 2 are the competitive characteristics of the equilibria in Figures 4 and 5. Theorem 8 shows that this equivalence holds for any number of prizes.
Theorem 8 Every sequence in
A m is a competitive characteristic for some head starts a m+1 < · · · < a 1 < a m+1 + V .
Theorems 7 and 8 fully describe the number and type of qualitatively different equilibria that can be generated by varying players' head starts, as captured by the competitive characteristic. This is summarized by the following corollary. Figure 6 : The supports of players' strategies (dots represent atoms) in the equilibria corresponding to the five possible competitive characteristics for m = 3: Figure 7 : The sequence of parentheses corresponding to the execution of the algorithm
In Figure 7 , the notation h 2 and l 1,4 is as introduced in Theorem 6. In I now turn to players' equilibrium (expected) expenditures. In the equilibria depicted in Figure 4 and plate (v) of Figure 6 , the best response set of every player i > 1 nests that of player i − 1. In such cases, by using part (c) of Theorem 6 it is straightforward to show that the expenditures of player i are higher than those of player i − 1. But when players' best response sets are not nested, which occurs in other competitive characteristics, some player i − 1 chooses scores from regions to which player i assigns probability 0. This is what happens in Figure 5 in the interval
It is therefore not immediately obvious whether players' expenditures can be ranked in general. The following corollary of the previous results shows that an unambiguous ranking exists regardless of the competitive characteristic.
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Proposition 3 For any two players i < j, the expenditures of player j are at least as high as those of player i, and are strictly higher if and only if a j < a i .
Comparison to Standard All-pay Auctions
In a standard all-pay auction, n ≥ 2 risk-neutral players compete for m < n identical prizes. Player i's commonly known valuation for a prize is V i , with V 1 ≥ · · · ≥ V n > 0. Each player makes a non-negative investment, and the m players who make the highest investments win one prize each. Relevant ties are decided using any tie-breaking rule (which is specified in advance).
This game is a contest in which c i (x) = x, so no scores are weakly dominated. For the contest to meet condition M3, assume that V m+1 is distinct from the valuation of every other player. Player i's reach is V i , so the contest's threshold is V m+1 . Theorem 1 shows that in any equilibrium of the contest the payoff of every player i < m+1 is equal to his power, V i −V m+1 , and the payoff of the other players is 0. Theorem 5 shows that the contest has a unique equilibrium, in which players m + 2, . . . , n choose 0. Clark and Riis (1998) and Siegel (2010) solved for this equilibrium (which can also be solved by the algorithm presented in this paper) and described the CDFs of players 1, . . . , m + 1 in closed form. Theorem 8, Corollary 5, and (11) in Siegel (2010) provide the following properties of the equilibrium.
Theorem 9
The unique equilibrium G of a standard all-pay auction has the following properties.
(a) For any two players i < j ≤ m+1, G i FOSD G j , so player i's expenditures and probability of winning a prize are at least as high as those of player j.
(b) The best response set of player i ≤ m + 1 is an interval with lower bound l i and upper bound V m+1 , and G i (x) > G i (y) for any two scores x > y in (l i , V m+1 ). For any two players i < j ≤ m + 1 we have l i ≥ l j . Also, l m = l m+1 = 0.
Players' atoms and best-response sets in the unique equilibrium are depicted in Figure 8 . Certain real-world asymmetries among competitors are naturally modeled by head starts, whereas other asymmetries are better modeled by differences in valuations for a prize. A comparison between the results of Section 4.2 and Theorem 9 elucidates the similarities and differences between the equilibrium predictions of the two models. Both models have a unique equilibrium, in which players m + 2, . . . , n do not participate. Stronger players choose higher scores than weaker players, in terms of FOSD and therefore on average, and consequently win a prize with higher probability. But whereas the expenditures of stronger players are higher than those of weaker players when players differ in their valuations, the opposite is true with head starts. 33 Another difference is that with head starts players 1, . . . , m + 1 compete in one or more competition zones, depending on the relative values of the head starts. Within each competition zone, all competing players choose scores from an interval, and these intervals all end at the same score. The intervals are shorter for weaker players, who are more aggressive than stronger players in terms of conditional FOSD. Varying players' head starts changes the competition zones in which different players compete, so that player i may choose scores from up to min {i, m} disjoint intervals of positive length. The possible qualitatively different equilibrium configurations are captured by the different competitive characteristics, of which there are an exponential number in m. In contrast, in a standard all-pay auction each player chooses scores from one interval, and these intervals all end at the threshold and are shorter for stronger players. The equilibrium can be thought of as consisting of one competition zone, (0, V m+1 ), within which players 1, . . . , m + 1 compete and stronger players are more aggressive than weaker players. Changing players' valuations does not change the qualitative form of the equilibrium (as long as V m+1 remains distinct from the valuation of every other player). This difference between the equilibrium predictions of the two models is illustrated by the difference between Figures 6 and 8.
To conclude the comparison between the models, consider a symmetric standard all-pay auction with n players and m prizes in which all players' valuations equal V > 0. This game, which is a special case of the all-pay auction with heterogeneous prizes analyzed by Yasar Barut and Kovenock (1998), has a continuum of equilibria. It is easy to verify that one equilibrium is for m + 1 players to employ the CDF G (x) = 1 − (1 − x/V ) 1/m on [0, V ] and for the other players to choose 0. This equilibrium is the limit of the equilibria that correspond to a sequence of standard all-pay auctions in which players have different valuations that approach V (provided that V m > V m+1 > V m+2 along the sequence). 34 The following result shows that this equilibrium is also the limit of the equilibria that correspond to a sequence of all-pay auctions with head starts that approach 0.
Proposition 4 Consider a sequence indexed by k of all-pay auctions with head starts a 
Conclusion
This paper has examined equilibrium behavior in a single-prize and multiprize contest model that accommodates various asymmetries, including head starts. When m+1 players compete for m prizes, there is a unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. As long as no additional players participate, which is the case when weaker players' costs are everywhere higher than those of the marginal player, uniqueness is maintained. The equilibrium is constructed by an algorithm, and the construction shows that players may choose scores from several intervals, have atoms at positive scores, and have aggregate gaps in their best-response sets.
To study the effects of head starts, I applied the algorithm to all-pay auctions with head starts and identical valuations. These contests have a unique equilibrium, in which players choose scores from one or more competition zones separated by gaps. Within each competition zone weaker players are more aggressive than stronger players. Weaker players' expected expenditures are also higher than those of stronger players. The qualitative form of the equilibrium changes with the relative values of players' head starts, and is closely related to sequences that consist of m open parentheses and m close parentheses that are correctly matched, whose cardinality is the Catalan number. These equilibrium properties contrast with the equilibrium predictions of the standard all-pay auction, in which players differ in their valuations for a prize.
One direction for future research is to study all-pay auctions that combine head starts and differing valuations. The algorithm can be applied to these contests as long as the participation result holds (for example, when a i < a m+1 and V i < V m+1 for every player i > m + 1). The resulting equilibrium would likely combine some features of the standard all-pay auction with those of the all-pay auction with head starts and identical valuations. Such a setting would also accommodate players with differing fixed costs and marginal costs, since a head start can be used to model fixed costs for the other players (the cost of overcoming the head start), and differing valuations can be used to model differing marginal costs (by dividing players' valuations and costs by their respective valuations).
Contest design, which has been touched upon in the online Appendix, is another direction for future research and application of the results. While the main application developed here was to head starts, the framework applies to a much broader range of asymmetries, as discussed in the Introduction. And because the equilibrium can be explicitly constructed for a large class of contests, many design goals are amenable to analysis. Such an analysis could help contest designers optimally employ the tools at their disposal.
A more difficult task is to characterize equilibrium behavior with asymmetric players and heterogeneous prizes. The difficulty lies in identifying players' equilibrium payoffs, which are required for executing the equilibrium construction algorithm. The payoffs are characterizes by Siegel (2009) when prizes are identical, but no corresponding result exists for heterogeneous prizes. An alternative approach is to solve for equilibrium directly. This has been done for a few contest specifications with heterogeneous prizes (see Barut and Kovenock (1998) , Bulow and Levin (2006), González-Díaz and Siegel (2012), and Xiao (2012)), but no method has been identified to accommodate a combination of general asymmetries and heterogeneous prizes. 35 Another technically challenging question is how to analyze contests in which more than m + 1 players participate. 35 The main obstacle is identifying players' best response sets without first knowing equilibrium payoffs.
A Proofs of Proposition 1 and Results from Section 3
I denote by e G= ³ e G 1 , . . . , e G m+1´a n equilibrium of an (m + 1)-player contest, where e G i (x) is the probability that player i chooses a score lower than or equal to x. I say that player i is stronger (weaker) than player j if i < j (i > j).
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Denote byC the contest in which player i's costs are c Claim 1 In any profile of strategies in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores, every player's payoff is the same in C andĈ.
Consider an equilibrium in C in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. If this is not an equilibrium inC, then some player i has a profitable deviation x inC, which implies that he has a profitable deviation y ≥ x that is not weakly dominated. By Claim 1, y is a profitable deviation for for player i in C. The same argument proves the other direction. Claim 1 also shows that in any such equilibrium every player's payoff is the same in C andC. To conclude, note thatĈ is derived fromC by adding the constant l i to player i's Bernoulli utility (adding −l i to his costs). This implies thatĈ andC are strategically equivalent, and also that for every strategy profile the payoff inC of player i is precisely l i lower than his payoff inĈ.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose that in e
G no player chooses weakly dominated scores, and denote by s inf the infimum of the union of the best response sets of players 1, . . . , m. Then e G m+1 (s inf ) > 0, e G i (s inf ) = 0 for every player i < m + 1, and s inf = x 0 .
Proof. By definition of s inf , there exists a player i < m + 1 and a set of scores {x k } ∞ k=1
that are best responses for player i such that x k → s inf . Because player i's power is positive, his probability of winning when choosing any score x k in the set is bounded away from 0, so by right-continuity of players' CDFs there is a player j 6 = i with e G j (s inf ) > 0. Suppose in contradiction that e G m+1 (s inf ) = 0. Then j 6 = m + 1, and because e G j (x) = 0 for every x < s inf , player j has an atom at s inf . The same argument for player j instead of player i shows that there is another player, in addition to player j, with an atom at s inf . Because e G m+1 (s inf ) = 0, not all players with an atom at s inf win a prize with probability 1 when choosing s inf , so by the Tie Lemma of Siegel (2009) (henceforth: Tie Lemma) they win a prize with probability 0 and have a payoff of 0 when choosing s inf . But players 1, . . . , m have a positive payoff, a contradiction. Thus, e G m+1 (s inf ) > 0. Because e G m+1 (x) = 0 for x < x 0 , we have that x 0 ≤ s inf . If x 0 = s inf , then the marginal player has an atom at s inf , so by the Tie Lemma e G i (s inf ) = 0 for i < m + 1. Therefore, to complete the proof it suffices to rule out x 0 < s inf . Suppose in contradiction that x 0 < s inf . By choosing a score x in (x 0 , s inf ) the marginal player wins a prize with probability 0 and incurs a positive cost, so no score in (x 0 , s inf ) is a best response for him. Therefore, if e G m+1 (s inf ) > e G m+1 (x 0 ) then the marginal player has an atom at s inf , which implies that s inf is a best reply for him. This means that another player has an atom at s inf (because c m+1 (s inf ) > c m+1 (x 0 ) = 0), which contradicts the Tie Lemma. If e G m+1 (s inf ) = e G m+1 (x 0 ) < 1, consider a player i < m + 1 such that (i) the player has best responses that approach s inf and (ii) no other player j < m + 1 has an atom at s inf (the Tie Lemma guarantees that such a player i exists). Then s inf is a best response for player i. But the CDFs of players other than i do not increase on (x 0 , s inf ], so all scores in (x 0 , s inf ) are at least as good as s inf for player i, contradicting the definition of s inf . Finally, if e G m+1 (s inf ) = e G m+1 (x 0 ) = 1, then all scores in (x 0 , s inf ] are at least as good as s inf for any player i who has best responses that approach s inf , contradicting the definition of s inf .
To complete the proof, it remains to show that e 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose in contradiction that e G j (y) < 1 for some player j at a score y that is not a best response for any player. This implies that no player has an atom at y, so by continuity of players' cost functions and CDFs at y, no player has best responses in some neighborhood of y. Denote by BR k y the set of player k's best responses above y, and by s inf,y the infimum of ∪ m+1 k=1 BR k y . Because e G j (y) < 1, BR j y is not empty, so s inf,y > y is well defined and no player has best responses in [y, s inf,y ). If s inf,y were not a best response for at least one player, then by the argument above no player would have best responses in a neighborhood of s inf,y , contradicting the definition of s inf,y . Consider a player k for whom s inf,y is a best response. Because c k (s inf,y ) ≥ c k (y) and y is not a best response for player k, he must win a prize with higher probability when choosing s inf,y than when choosing y. This means that some player other than k has an atom at s inf,y , because no player has best responses in [y, s inf,y ). This implies that s inf,y is a best response for that other player, which requires another player to have an atom at s inf,y . Therefore, there are at least two players with an atom at s inf,y . By the Tie Lemma, either all the players with an atom at s inf,y win a prize with probability 0 or all win a prize with probability 1 when choosing s inf,y . If the former is true, then y is a best response for the players with an atom at s inf,y , a contradiction. If the latter is true, then denote by N 0 the set of players l for whom e G l (s inf,y ) = 1. This set is non-empty, otherwise no player could win a prize with probability 1 by choosing s inf,y . Moreover, every player in N 0 has an atom at s inf,y , otherwise e G l (y) = 1 for a player l in N 0 , so scores slightly below s inf,y would be best-responses for every player with an atom at s inf,y , a contradiction. Now consider the positive-probability event that the (m + 1)− |N 0 | players not in 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof requires two lemmas.
Lemma 5 Suppose that a checkpoint x < T has been reached with G i (x) < 1 for every player i, so Stage 2 is executed. If the algorithm proceeds to Stage 3, then the next checkpointx satisfies (i)x < T and (ii)
Proof. By definition of the checkpointx identified in Stage 3, A + (x) contains at least one player i for whom c i (x) = c i (x). Because player i is in CP (x), (2) holds. Because G j (x) < 1 for every player j, (2) implies that
and consequently c i (x) < c i (T ), which implies that (i) holds. For (ii), recall that Stage 3 specifies to set G j (x) = G j (x) for every player j 6 = i. To see that G i (x) ≤ G i (x) ≤ 1, note thatx < T implies V j − c j (x) ≥ w j for every player j. Therefore, the lowest value of G i (x) such that a player other than i is in CP (x) is at most 1. Moreover, because for every playerĩ either (1) or (2) holds withĩ instead of i, cĩ (x) ≥ cĩ (x), and G j (x) = G j (x) for every player j 6 = i, the lowest value of G i (x) such that a player other than i is in CP (x) is at least G i (x).
Lemma 6 Suppose that a checkpoint x < T has been reached with G i (x) < 1 for every player i, so Stage 2 is executed. If the algorithm proceeds to Stage 4, then the next checkpointx satisfies (i)x ≤ T , (ii) G i is non-decreasing on [x,x] and G i (x) ≤ 1 for every player i, and (iii) ifx = T then G i (x) = 1 for some player i.
Proof. The extension of G to [x,x] in Stage 4 is such that the hazard rate
(where the derivative is a right-derivative) of every player i in A + (x) at scores y immediately 36 If |N 0 | = m + 1, then this is the event that all players choose s inf,y . above x equals H (x, y) − ε i (y) ≥ 0. This shows that G is non-decreasing immediately above x. The checkpointx is chosen so that if player i's hazard rate is non-negative immediately above x, then his hazard rate remains non-negative up tox. Therefore, G is non-decreasing in [x,x] . Also, ifx ≤ T then G i (x) ≤ 1 for every player i, becausex is chosen so that when G is extended to [x,x] no player can obtain more than his power by choosing a score in [x,x]. Ifx ≥ T , then the CDF of at least one player is 1 at T when G is extended as specified in Stage 4, because for a player to obtain his power by choosing T he must win a prize with probability 1, and every player in CP (x) obtains his power in [x,x]. Thusx ≥ T impliesx = T .
To prove Lemma 3, first suppose that G m+1 (x 0 ) = 1. Then Stage 1 is followed by Stage 5. By part (ii) of Condition M3, c m+1 (T ) > c m+1 (0) = 0, so x L = x 0 < T. For the remainder of the proof, suppose that G m+1 (x 0 ) < 1, and recall that by definition G i (x 0 ) = 0 for every player i 6 = m + 1. Lemmas 5 and 6 suggest two possibilities. The first possibility is that
for some player i is reached after Stages 3 and 4 are executed a finite number of times. In this case, the statement of the lemma holds. The second possibility is that Stage 3 or 4 (or both) are executed infinitely many times. To complete the proof, it suffices to rule out this possibility. That Stage 3 is executed at most a finite number of times follows because the checkpoint identified in Stage 3 is the endpoint of a maximal interval on which a player's cost function in constant, and every player's cost function is constant on at most a finite number of such intervals because cost functions are piecewise analytic. If Stage 4 is executed an infinite number of times, then there exists a sequence of consecutive checkpoints x 1 < x 2 < . . ., all identified via iterations of Stage 4. By Lemmas 5 and 6, and because Stage 5 is not reached, the value of every player's CDF at every checkpoint in the sequence is less than 1, and lim k→∞ x k ≤ T . The proof of Lemma 7 in Siegel (2010) shows that because cost functions are piecewise analytic there is only a finite number of checkpoints x k in the sequence for which
). This means that there is an infinite subsequence of consecutive checkpoints
together with (5) 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove that G is an equilibrium, it suffices to show three things: (i) G is a profile of CDFs (non-decreasing, right-continuous, and lim x→∞ G (x) = 1), (ii) no player can obtain a payoff higher than his power by choosing any score when the other players choose scores according to 37 A proof similar to that of Lemma 4 in Siegel (2010) shows that G is analytic at b.
G, and (iii) every player i assigns G i -measure 1 to scores that give him a payoff equal to his power when the other players choose scores according to G. Item (i) follows from the construction of G, Lemma 3, and part (ii) of Lemmas 5 and 6. For (ii), by construction of G no player can obtain more than his power by choosing a score in
, where x L is the last checkpoint identified by the algorithm. Also, by definition of power no player can obtain more than his power above T . It therefore suffices to show that no player can obtain more than his power by choosing a score in
for every player j < m + 1. This is enough: by Stage 5, the marginal player cannot increase his probability of winning a prize by increasing his chosen score from x L to a score in ¡ x L , T ¢ , and every other player obtains his power by choosing a score in 
, the same contradictions showed for the marginal player hold for any player j < m + 1 with c j ¡ x L ¢ < c j (T ). For (iii), note that a player's CDF increases continuously only in Stage 4, and G is extended in Stage 4 in such a way that all players whose CDFs increase obtain their power (because they are all in A + (x)). It remains to show that a player obtains precisely his power whenever he has an atom. By construction, a player can be assigned an atom in Stage 1, 3, or 5. Stage 1 assigns an atom only to the marginal player, at x 0 , and the marginal player obtains a payoff of 0 (equal to his power) when choosing x 0 . Each execution of Stage 3 identifies a checkpointx and assigns an atom to at most one player, atx. That player obtain his power atx, because he is in CP (x) and there is no tie atx (because no other player has an atom there). For Stage 5, consider two cases. If x L < T , then Lemma 7 shows that Stage 5 assigns atoms to a subset of players 1, . . . , m at scores at which they win with probability 1 and whose cost equals their cost of choosing the threshold, so they obtain their power by choosing these scores. If 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose that in e G no player chooses weakly dominated scores. I will show that G = e G. The following lemma shows that if G and e G differ, they differ at scores lower than x L , the last checkpoint in G.
, no other player j has best responses in G or e G at scores y for which c j (
, where x max j is defined as in Stage 5. And because in e G no player chooses weakly dominated scores, e
For the next step, divide the checkpoints in G, excluding x L , into "constant checkpoints"
and "increasing checkpoints." A constant checkpoint leads to Stage 3, i.e., it is a checkpoint at which at least one active player's cost function is constant. An increasing checkpoint leads to Stage 4, i.e., it is a checkpoint at which all active players' cost functions are increasing. The next lemma shows that if G and e G coincide at a constant checkpoint, then they coincide at all scores up to the following checkpoint. Denote by x k and x k+1 two consecutive checkpoints.
Proof. By construction, because x k is a constant checkpoint, there is a player i in CP (x k ) for which c i (x k ) = c i (x k+1 ). This means that e G j (y) = e G j (x k ) for every other player j and
. This is true because G i (x k+1 ) < e G i (x k+1 ) implies that some player other than i obtains more than his power immediately above x k+1 , and G i (x k+1 ) > e G i (x k+1 ) implies that Lemma 2 is violated immediately above x k+1 , as explained in the paragraph preceding the statement of Lemma 2.
Denote by f CP (x) the set of players i for which (2) holds with e G i instead of G i .
Proof. By construction, CP (x) = A + (x k ) for every x in (x k , x k+1 ). This implies that for every
, because player i does not have best responses in (x k , x k+1 ) so his CDF does not increase (in both equilibria). For every player i in A + (x k ) and every x in (x k , x k+1 ) (2) holds with e G i instead of G i , so e G i is given by (5) . This shows that e
In this case, by construction G is continuous at x k+1 , so the same must be true for e G, otherwise a player in A + (x k ) would get in e G more than his power. Therefore, e G(
and G i is continuous at x L for some player i, so the same is true for e G. Consider another player j. Because in both e G and G players do not choose weakly dominated scores, if player j's cost function is constant at x L , then he does not have an atom at
If player j's cost function is increasing at x L , then in both e G and G he does not have best responses above x L (he wins with probability
Suppose that G 6 = e G, and denote by x k the highest checkpoint such that G (y) = e G(y) for every y in [0, x k ] (Lemmas 1 and 8 show that x k is well defined and x k < x L ). Lemma 9 shows that x k is an increasing checkpoint. Lemma 10 shows that f CP (x) 6 = CP (x) for some x in (x k , x k+1 ).
I conclude the proof by showing that
follows from Lemma 9 in Siegel (2010), which applies here. 38 This inclusion means that in both equilibria only the CDFs of players in A + (x k ) = CP (x) increase on (x k , x k+1 ). Because x k is an increasing checkpoint, the costs of all players in A + (x k ) are increasing at every x in (x k , x k+1 ).
Therefore, in both equilibria the CDFs of these players are continuous on (x k , x k+1 ). 39 Lemmas 38 In the proof of that lemma, replace v i (x) with V i − c i (x) for every player i, and note that here we havē
39 If a player had an atom in (x k , x k+1 ), then because no player's CDF reaches 1 before x k+1 , no other player would choose scores immediately below x k . But then the player would be better off by shifting the mass of his atom to a lower score. The proof of Lemma 1 in Siegel (2009) provides a more detailed argument.
10 and 11 in Siegel (2010) now imply that CP (x) ⊆ f CP (x). Therefore, G = e G.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose that all players behave as specified in the statement of the theorem. Then, players 1, . . . , m + 1 do not have profitable deviations, because their probability of winning at any score higher than x 0 coincides with their probability of winning at that score in the reduced contest with players 1, . . . , m + 1, and their probability of winning at any score lower than or equal to x 0 is at most their probability of winning at that score in the reduced contest. This is because, by assumption, players m + 2, . . . , n do not choose scores higher than x 0 . Players m + 2, . . . , n do not have profitable deviations, because the proof of Theorem 2 in Siegel (2009) shows that if a player i > m + 1 could obtain a positive payoff when players 1, . . . , m + 1 play according to the equilibrium constructed by the algorithm, then the marginal player could do the same, and this deviation in the reduced contest would contradict Theorem 1 applied to the reduced contest. This shows that the behavior specified in the statement of the theorem is an equilibrium. For uniqueness, consider an equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly dominated scores. Because players m + 2, . . . , n do not participate and do not choose weakly dominated scores, they behave as in the statement of the theorem. In particular, they do not choose scores above x 0 . But now the same arguments used to describe the algorithm show that the only behavior of players 1, . . . , m + 1 consistent with equilibrium is the one specified by the algorithm (Lemma 1 holds, and above x 0 a player in {1, . . . , m + 1} wins a prize if and only if his score is higher than that of at least one other player in {1, . . . , m + 1}).
A.8 Lemmas 11 and 12
Lemma 11 At every checkpoint x that has been reached, CP (x) contains at least two players, and (1) holds for every player i not in CP (x).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of checkpoints that have been reached. The first checkpoint is x 0 , and G (x 0 ) is set to the lowest value such that CP (x 0 ) contains player m+1 and at least one other player, so for every player i not in CP (x 0 ) (1) holds. For the induction step, consider two consecutive checkpoints x <x. By the induction hypothesis, CP (x) contains at least two players, and for every player i not in CP (x) (1) holds. The first possibility is that CP (x) contains at least one player i whose cost function is constant at x. Thenx is identified in Stage 3, and G (x) is set to the lowest value such that CP (x) contains player i and at least one other player, so for every player i not in CP (x) (1) holds withx instead of x. The second possibility is that the cost functions of all players in CP (x) are increasing at x. Thenx is identified in Stage 4, and G is defined on 
B Proofs of Results from Section 4
To simplify the exposition, I assume that a m+1 = 0 and V = 1, and that all the a i s are distinct. Relaxing these assumptions does not change the results or the logic of the proofs, but complicates the notation and exposition. One implication of these assumptions is that every player i's power is a i .
The following lemmas describe properties of G used in the proofs below.
Lemma 13 If i is in CP (x) for some x in [a i , 1), then for all k such that x ≥ a k we have
Proof. Because x < 1, G l (x) < 1 for every player l (otherwise every other player would obtain more than his power by choosing scores slightly above x). From (2) we have
so if x ≥ a k player k can obtain more than his power immediately above x. And if
Lemma 14 If the algorithm proceeds to Stage 4 at a checkpoint x, then A + (x) = CP (x).
Proof. Proceeding to Stage 4 means that for every player i in CP (x) the costs are increasing at x so x ≥ a i . And for every player i and every score y ≥ a i , we have that
That ε i for every player i in CP (x) does not depend on i implies that either all players in CP (x) are in A + (x) or none of them are. Because A + (x) ⊆ CP (x) and A + (x) contains at least two players, A + (x) = CP (x).
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
I first show by reverse induction on k = m, . . . , 1 that for every two players j > i and every Suppose that the claim holds for k, . . . , m. By (c), some x in (a k+1 , a k ) is a best response for player k, so k is in CP (x). Because player k's costs are 0 up to a k , at x Stage 3 is executed. Because no player k 0 < k has best responses below a k (by (c)) and the costs of every player k 0 > k are increasing at every score above x, the checkpoint following x is a k and k is in CP (a k ). By Stage 3, G i (a k ) = G i (x) for every player i 6 = k. Also by Stage 3, G k (a k ) is set so that at least one player other than k is in CP (a k ). Suppose first that CP (a k ) contains a player k 0 < k. Then k 0 = k − 1, because for every i < k − 1 we have w k−1 < w i and c i (a k ) = c k−1 (a k ) = 0. Now, because player k − 1 has constant costs at a k , Stage 3 is executed at a k and no player's CDF increases in (a k , a k−1 ). This implies (b) (at a k−1 no player l > k − 1 has an atom) and (c) for h k = a k . To complete the induction step in this case, it remains to show that G k (a k ) ≤ G i (a k ) for every player i > k. But this is immediate from Lemma 13, because k is in CP (a k ). Now suppose that CP (a k ) does not contain any player k 0 < k. Then, by Lemma 13 the CDFs at a k of all players in CP (a k ) coincide, and are lower than the CDF of any player k 0 > k not in CP (a k ). Because CP (a k ) does not contain players k 0 < k, Stage 4 is executed at a k , and by Lemma 14 we have
, where y is the checkpoint following a k , Lemma 13 shows that the CDFs of all players in
It cannot be that y ≥ a k−1 , otherwise an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 13 applied to scores slightly below a k−1 would show that player k − 1 can obtain more than his power by choosing a k−1 . Because y < a k−1 and the hazard rates at y of all players in A + (a k ) are identical, and therefore positive, 40 at y another player l becomes active (l is in CP (y) \A + (a k )). If l > k, by Lemma 13 the CDFs of the players in A + (a k ) at y coincide with G l (y), and y is the first score above a k at which the CDFs of the players in A + (a k ) coincide with the CDF of any player k 0 > k. Therefore, G l (y) is strictly lower than the CDF at y of every player k 0 > k not in CP (y). Stage 4 is then executed at y, A + (y) = CP (y), and the CDFs of all players in A + (y) coincide up to the checkpoint following y. Continuing in this way, it cannot be that only players k 0 > k become active before a k−1 is reached, otherwise player k − 1 could obtain more than his power by choosing a k−1 . At the first checkpoint above a k at which a player k 0 < k becomes active, player k − 1 becomes active (because for every To complete the proof it suffices to show that for every two players j > i and every two scores y > x in [a 1 , 1) (a) and (b) hold. This can be done by following the analysis above for the case in which CP (a k ) does not contain any player k 0 < k, and noting that at every checkpoint up to 1 additional players become active.
Proof. Lemma 13 shows that G i (x) ≤ G k (x), and Proposition 2 shows that G k (x) ≤ G i (x). Lemma 13 then shows (a), and Proposition 2 shows (b).
B.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Denote by P k (x) the probability that player k wins a prize when he chooses x and the other players choose scores according to G, and by P k the probability that player k wins a prize when all players choose scores according to G. To show that P i ≥ P j , note that if player i chooses x 6 = a j , then player j chooses a lower score with probability G j (x), and if j chooses x 6 = a i , then i chooses a lower score with probability G i (x). Therefore, because by Proposition 2
and players other than i do not have an atom at a i , we have P i (a i ) ≥ P j (a i ) regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Together with the fact that player i chooses a j with probability 0, this implies that
40 The hazard rate of player i at y is H (a k , y) − ε i (y).
To complete the proof it suffices to show that a i > a i+1 implies that at least one of the last two inequalities holds strictly with j = i+1 (equilibrium uniqueness implies that G i = G i+1 , and 
, and therefore P i (x) > P i+1 (x) (because no CDF reaches 1 before 1, otherwise the marginal player could obtain a positive payoff). This implies that
As in the proof of Proposition 3, we have that G i+1 (a i ) > 0, which together with
Therefore, if ties at a i between players i and i + 1 are not broken deterministically in favor of player i + 1, then P i (a i ) > P i+1 (a i ), and again
Let the function P α i+1 coincide with P i+1 for x 6 = a i and set P α i+1 (x) = α. Then,
, where the weak inequality follows from FOSD and the equality holds because player i+1 chooses a i with probability 0.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Part (a): Part (a) of Corollary 4 shows that if l > i is in A i , then so are i, . . . , l − 1. Therefore, if m + 1 is in A 1 , then A 1 = {1, 2, . . . , m + 1}. Suppose m + 1 is not in A 1 , so G m+1 does not increase on [a 1 , 1) . Because G m+1 (a 1 ) < 1 (otherwise player 1 would obtain more than his power by choosing scores slightly above a 1 ) and at every score up to 1 at least one player is active (Lemma 2), lim y→1 G i (y) = 1 for some player i (otherwise no player would obtain his power at scores immediately below 1). But this contradicts Proposition 2. To complete the proof of (i) it remains to show that A i = {i} is impossible. This impossibility obtains because player i's costs are strictly increasing in (a i , a i−1 ), so for a score x in (a i , a i−1 ) to be a best-response for player i, his probability of winning when choosing x must be higher than his probability of winning when choosing a lower score, for example a i + (x − a i ) /2. This requires at least one other player to choose scores in [a i + (x − a i ) /2, x) ⊆ (a i , a i−1 ) with positive probability. But if A i = {i}, then no player i + 1, . . . , m + 1 chooses scores in (a i , a i−1 ) with positive probability. And players 1, . . . , i − 1 do not choose scores in (a i , a i−1 ) with positive probability, because such scores are weakly dominated by their respective head starts. For (ii), suppose that A i ∩ A i 0 6 = φ. To show that A i ⊆ A i 0 , by (i) it suffices to show that k i is in A i 0 . Consider some j in A i ∩ A i 0 . Because k i is in A i and j ≤ k i , part (b) of Corollary 4 shows that there is a score x in (a i , a i−1 ) such that G j (y) = G k i (y) for every y > x. But then Lemma 13 shows that player k i is active at any score y in (a h , a h−1 ) at which player j is active, so k i is in A i 0 because j is in A i 0 .
Part (b): Take a player j in A i , and consider the induction step for k = i in the proof of Proposition 2. Because player j ≥ i has best responses in (a i , a i−1 ) (where a 0 = 1), the induction step shows that CP (a i ) does not contain any player i 0 < i (otherwise only player i − 1 would have best responses in (a i , a i−1 )). And if CP (a i ) does not contain any player i 0 < i, then the induction step identifies a score h i ≤ a i−1 such that if a player is active at a score in [a i , h i ) then the player remains active until h i , and no player i 0 ≥ i has best responses in (h i , a i−1 ). Moreover,
is the score at which player i − 1 becomes active), and h 1 = 1. Therefore, the set of best responses in (a i , a i−1 ) of every player j in A i is an interval with upper bound h i . That G j (x) > G j (y) for any two scores x > y in (l i,j , h i ) follows from the fact that G j , given by (5), strictly increases in some right-neighborhood of y (where A + does not change). For players (a 1 , 1) . Because at least one player is active at every score up to 1 (Lemma 2), lim x→1 G i (x) = 1 for every player i, otherwise no player 1, . . . , m + 1 could obtain his power at scores immediately below 1.
Part (e): For every x in (a i , l i,k ) we have G k (x) = G k (a i ), so it remains to show that the claimed inequality holds for every x in (l i,k , a i−1 ). For every x in [l i,k , a i−1 ], part (c) shows that G k (x) = G j (x), which means that the inequality is equivalent to
. But for any y ≤ z and ε ≥ 0, y/z ≤ (y + ε) / (z + ε), so the inequality holds.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Equilibrium uniqueness implies if a i = a i+1 then G i = G i+1 , so players i and i + 1 have identical expenditures. Choose a player i ≤ m, and let
Part (a) of Theorem 6 shows that i + 1 is in A 1 , so Proposition 2 and Corollary 4 show that x inf < 1 and G i (y) = G i+1 (y) for every y ≥ x inf . Therefore, the difference between the expenditures of player i + 1 and player i at scores higher than
The expenditures of player i on [0, a i ] are 0, and his expenditures on
, and are strictly less than (1
41 Therefore, to complete the proof it suffices to show that
For this, let us obtain a useful expression for P inf . First, note that if player i + 1 is active at a score y in
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, i is in CP (a i ). Therefore, (2) and the fact that G k (a i ) = 0 for k < i show that
Therefore,
is non-negative if and only if
, and because CDFs are non-decreasing we have 1 − b ≥ a i+1 .
B.5 Proof of Theorem 7
To show that the cardinality of A m is C m , I first define B m , a set of sequences that correspond to all the balanced expressions with m open parentheses and m close parentheses. Each sequence in B m "mirrors" a different balanced expression.
Lemma 15 Let
for every i > 1, b i is a non-negative integer and
The cardinality of B m is C m . ª for k > 0. For example, for m = 2, the expression (()) leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3} , φ, and the expression ()() leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3}. For m = 3, the expression ((())) leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3, 4} , φ, φ, the expression (()()) leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3, 4} , {2, 3} , φ, the expression (())() leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4} , φ, the expression ()(()) leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3, 4} , φ, {3, 4}, and the expression ()()() leads to the sequence {1, 2, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4} , {3, 4}. For m = 2, A 2 consists of the two sequences {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3} , φ. Figure 4 corresponds to the sequence {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3}: in (a 1 , 1) all three players compete, and in (a 2 , a 1 ) only players 2 and 3 compete. Also, D 2 \ {1} = {{2, 3}}, and the set of scores in [a 1 , 1) at which (2) holds for players i = 2, 3 is [a 1 , 1). Figure 5 corresponds to the sequence {1, 2, 3} , φ: in (a 1 , 1) all three players compete, and in (a 2 , a 1 ) no player competes. Also, D 2 \ {1} = {{2} , {3}}, the set of scores in [a 1 , 1) at which (2) holds for player i = 2 is [a 1 , 1), the set of scores in [a 1 , 1) at which (2) holds for player i = 3 is [2a 2 − a (ã 1 , 1) . The modified contest has m + 2 players, m + 1 prizes of value 1, and head starts 0 < a m+1 < · · · < a 1 < 1, with a i =ã i−1 for i > 1. Denote by G = (G 1 , . . . , G m+2 ) the equilibrium of this contest. It is easy to see that the execution of the algorithm on [0,ã 1 ) = [0, a 2 ) is the same for both contests, so G i (x) = e G i−1 (x) for every i > 1 and x < a 2 =ã 1 . This immediately implies that in G, among players i, . . . , m + 2, precisely the players in A i compete in (a i , a i−1 ), for i > 2. Moreover, part (a) of Theorem 6 shows that all players compete in (a 1 , 1) . I will show that a 1 can be chosen so that in G, among players 2, . . . , m + 2, precisely the players in A 2 compete in (a 2 , a 1 ) and (ii) holds.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 8
If A 2 = φ, set a 1 to any value in
This interval is non-empty, because e G 1 (ã 1 ) > 0 and in e G player 1 is active atã 1 so 1 − Π m+1 i=2 ³ 1 − e G i (ã 1 )´=ã 1 (as shown in the proof of Proposition 2). Choosing a 1 in the specified interval guarantees that G 2 (a 2 ) < e G 1 (ã 1 ) (otherwise in G player 1 would obtain at least 1 − Π m+1 i=1
by choosing scores immediately above a 2 ). And G 2 (a 2 ) < e G 1 (ã 1 ) implies that CP (a 2 ) = {1, 2} in the modified contest, since e G 1 (ã 1 ) was minimal atom size atã 1 such that in e G some player i > 1 would be active immediately aboveã 1 = a 2 . Therefore, at a 2 the algorithm proceeds to Stage 3, G does not change in (a 2 , a 1 ), and players 2, . . . , m + 2 do not compete in (a 2 , a 1 ) .
If A 2 6 = φ, then A 2 = {2, 3, . . . , j} for some 3 ≤ j ≤ m + 2. Denote byx k ≥ã 1 the score identified in (ii) (applied to e G) that corresponds to the partition element in e D 2 \ {1} that contains k. If j = m + 2, then set a 1 to any value in
(Note that 1 − Π m+1 i=2 ³ 1 − e G i (x m+1 )´=x m+1 , because every score in (ã 1 , 1) is a best response in e G for player 1, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, so a 1 >x m+1 .) If j < m + 2, then, by part (b) of Theorem 6,x j−1 ≤x j . To see that the inequality is strict, note that j and j + 1 belong to different partition elements in D 2 (since A 2 = D 2 \D 3 ), and therefore in D 3 (D 2 is a coarsening of D 3 ), so j − 1 and j belong to different partition elements in e D 2 \ {1}. So (ii) (applied to e G) shows thatx j−1 <x j . In this case, set a 1 to any value in Theorem 6 shows that this interval is non-empty).
This value of a 1 guarantees that player 1 obtains his power for the first time at a score y < a 1 in (x j−1 ,x j ), so G i (x) = e G i−1 (x) for every i > 1 and x ≤ y. As a result, every score in (x j−1 , y) ⊆ (a 2 , a 1 ) is a best response in G for players 2, 3 , . . . , j (because, by definition of x j−1 , every score in (x j−1 , y) is a best response in e G for player j − 1, and, by Corollary 4, for every player i < j − 1). Because in G players j + 1, j + 2, . . . , m + 2 do not have best responses in (a 2 , y) ⊆ (ã 1 ,x j ) (by definition ofx k , for k ≥ j, becausex j ≤x k ), and at y the algorithm proceeds to Stage 3 and no player's CDF increases until a 1 , in G players j + 1, j + 2, . . . , m + 2 do not compete in (a 2 , a 1 ). This shows that in G, among players 2, . . . , m + 2, precisely the players in A 2 compete in (a 2 , a 1 ) .
To see that (ii) holds in G, consider any two players in the same partition element in D 2 \ {1}. There is a maximal k < m + 2 for which both players are in the same partition element in D k , which implies that both players are in A k = D k \D k+1 . Since k ≥ 2, Corollary 4 shows that the CDFs of the two players coincide at some score x < a 1 , and remain equal for all higher scores. Part (ii) of Lemma 13 then shows that the players' best response sets in (x, 1) are the same, which suffices because of part (b) of Theorem 6. Now consider two players i < j that belong to different partition elements in D 2 \ {1}. To complete the proof, we must show that the players' sets of best responses in (a 1 , 1) are two distinct intervals with upper bound 1. By part (b) of Theorem 6, it suffices to show that the players' sets of best responses in (a 1 , 1) are distinct. There are two cases to consider. The first case is i = 2 and {2} is in D 2 . That {2} is in D 2 implies that A 2 = φ (because A 2 = D 2 \D 3 , {2} is in D 3 , and if A 2 6 = φ, then A 2 includes 2 and at least one other player k > 2). As described above, the choice of a 1 when A 2 = φ is such that in G we have CP (a 2 ) = {1, 2}, which implies that CP (a 1 ) = {1, 2}.
43 This, together with the observation that Stage 4 is executed at a 1 , means that scores immediately above a 1 are best responses for player 2 and are not best responses for any player j > 2. The second case to consider is i > 2 or {2} is not in D 2 . If i = 2, choose another player i other than 2 from the partition element in D 2 \ {1} that contains 2 (we already know that players in the same partition element in D 2 \ {1} have the same best responses in (a 1 , 1) ). Because i and j are in separate partition elements in D 2 , they are in separate partition elements in D 3 (D 2 is a coarsening of D 3 ), and therefore i − 1 and j − 1 are in separate partition elements of e D 2 \ {1}. Therefore, in e G their best response sets in (ã 1 , 1) are, respectively, [x i−1 , 1) \ {ã 1 } and [x j−1 , 1) for somex i−1 <x j−1 . Because j is not in A 2 (otherwise i < j would also be in A 2 , and therefore both would belong to the same partition element in
